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Introduction
Transparency is an emerging issue in national and global environmental poli-
tics and governance; this much becomes clear from the contributions included
in this special issue. Roughly deªned as the disclosure of information, transpar-
ency is particularly prominent in the ªeld of environment, although it is cer-
tainly not limited to this ªeld. It builds upon the earlier right-to-know move-
ments, legislation and practices, originating in the US and other advanced
industrialized democracies, but is now spreading around the globe to other na-
tions, localities and transnational institutions.1
The growing popularity of, attention to and practices of transparency is not
an accidental and fashionable wave, soon to be replaced by another timely topic
in environmental governance studies. Transparency is here to stay and to further
develop in environmental politics, as it is closely related to a number of wider so-
cial developments in globalized modernity.2 But it is far from clear how, in what
way and direction, for whom and with what (side-) effects transparency will “un-
fold.” The various articles in this special issue critically scrutinize current transpar-
ency-in-practice and analyze and assess it against two sets of criteria:
• normative criteria related to democracy, participation and right to know
• substantive criteria related to better environmental protection or more ef-
fective environmental governance
To be sure, all contributions provide evidence that we are still at an early stage of
a development towards what is hopefully a more mature, full-ºedged, compre-
hensive, standardized transparency. In global environmental politics, current
transparency-in-practice has many shortcomings and practical limitations in
terms of standardization of disclosure,3 the categories for which disclosure is
1. See, for example, Zhang et al. forthcoming.
2. See Mol 2008.
3. Dingwerth and Eichinger 2010.
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mandatory,4 a focus on procedures rather than outcomes,5 and the power in-
equalities accompanying governance through transparency.6 These shortcom-
ings notwithstanding, the contributions do not conclude that transparency is a
“red herring,” and that initiatives for furthering transparency are doomed to fail
as they fall victim to power inequalities in global environmental politics. All
contributions analyze transparency with a basic, positive connotation, not un-
like concepts of democracy and participation. More than incidentally these
three concepts—transparency, democracy and participation—are related to each
other in environmental politics and governance, although the three do not al-
ways mutually strengthen each other.7 Transparency combines with democracy
and participation in striving for emancipatory environmental politics, by giving
prevalence to and making room for bottom-up civil society engagements. The
common idea is then: the more transparency, the better. That is: better for the
environment, better for democracy and better for the empowerment of the op-
pressed. This hypothesis is also very much the starting point in all contributions
in this special issue. So Mason, for instance, argues for further inclusion of pow-
erful private entities in mandatory information disclosure duties under the
Aarhus Convention, to empower civil society.8 And with similar arguments
Hauºer asks for mandatory instead of the present voluntary disclosure schemes
in the extractive industries.9 Although the various contributions argue and show
that current practices and institutions of transparency in global environmental
politics have numerous shortcomings in their design and operationalization, in
principle transparency is to be welcomed and to be improved.
I concur with the idea that currently we need indeed more rather than less
transparency. In further analyzing developments around transparency in this
article, I want to add three observations to the ones elaborated in the other con-
tributions to this special issue. First, transparency developments should be un-
derstood as structurally connected to wider developments in environmental
politics and society, giving transparency some permanancy and power. Second, I
want to balance and condition the idea that more transparency is always better,
by noting some potential drawbacks and pitfalls. And third, I highlight some fu-
ture promises in transparency developments, of which the contours can already
be identiªed.
The Power of Transparency
To understand the logic, strengths and transformative power of transparency, we
have to place it against the background of what I have elsewhere called informa-
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5. Auld and Gulbrandsen 2010.
6. Gupta 2010b; and Florini 2010.
7. See also Auld and Gulbrandsen 2010.
8. Mason 2010.
9. Hauºer 2010.
tional governance10 and what others have referred to as regulation by informa-
tion.11 The concept of informational politics and governance implies that for
understanding the current innovations and changes in environmental gover-
nance, we have to concentrate on the centripetal movement of informational
processes, informational resources, and informational politics. It is the produc-
tion, the processing, the use, and the ºow of, as well as the access to and the
control over, information that is increasingly becoming vital in contemporary
environmental governance practices and institutions. Information and knowl-
edge are becoming important resources in environmental politics; the sites and
spaces of environmental controversy relocate to information; and the motiva-
tions and sources for changing unsustainable behavior are increasingly infor-
mational.
This centripetal movement of informational processes in today’s environ-
mental governance is not just an answer to the shortcomings and failures in
conventional environmental policies and politics. It should not be seen as a vol-
untary choice of policy-makers for just another environmental policy instru-
ment to change the behavior of polluters, instead of laws or environmental
taxes. Rather, it should be understood against the background of and closely
connected to, a number of key social processes that make up the Information
Age:12 globalization processes; the changing sovereignty and steering powers of
nation-states and the emergence of new modes of governance; the growing un-
certainties connected to the disenchantment with science; and various techno-
logical developments related to ICT and the Internet. Few have yet analyzed and
understood what the Information Age means for environmental politics and
governance.13 It is clear, however, that informational governance—and with that
transparency—is structurally embedded and increasingly institutionalized
within wider developments of global modernity and, as such, it has some
permanency.
The notion of informational governance of the environment brings a
number of seemingly widespread developments coherently together under one
common denominator. It enables us to understand the logic of and coherence
in various developments, including: the increasing signiªcance of reputational
capital of companies; the growing power and vulnerability of legitimatory capi-
tal of environmental NGOs; the emergence and power of new environmental
monitoring arrangements involving multiple actors; the central role of conven-
tional and new digital media in environmental politics and controversies; and
the power and inºuence of accountability, transparency and disclosure in envi-
ronmental governance. One can study each of these developments separately.
But it is vital to be aware and understand that such separate developments are
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interconnected and “structurally” embedded in wider social developments and
trends.
Thus the growing attention to—as well as power and strength of—trans-
parency in environmental politics can only be understood against this wider
background of informational politics and governance. With information be-
coming more central in governance and politics, transparency is moving from
just a normative call for right-to-know towards the center of struggles for envi-
ronmental quality and sustainability. Access to and control over information,
data and knowledge have become vital in contemporary environmental politics,
because environmental controversies and struggles are increasingly located
within the “information scape.” Thus transparency relates directly to power as it
aims to democratize information and empower the powerless by providing
them with one of the most powerful resources in current times: access to and
control over information and knowledge. The various contributions to this spe-
cial issue provide evidence of the centrality of power in transparency and
disclosure.
There is one additional point that deserves mention. Ever since the early
days of the environmental movement in the 1960s, environmental activists and
pollution victims have used information as one of their main resources in strug-
gles with the powers-that-be over environmental controversies, not least due to
shortcomings of the environmental movement in economic and political capi-
tal and resources. Now that “informational capital” is becoming increasingly
inºuential in environmental politics, civil society environmentalists have
gained a comparative advantage, especially when transparency provisions and
institutions limit monopolies on information held by economic and state elites.
In that sense, transparency adds to the comparative strength and power of civil
society in the Information Age.
Transparency Pitfalls
The power of transparency recounted above might hold in ideal typical situa-
tions. But all contributions to this special issue analyze and disclose current
shortcomings of transparency legislation, institutional arrangements, “infra-
structures” and practices. The contributions make us aware that current trans-
parency arrangements are far from ideal and need further improvement, in or-
der to live up to their normative and substantial aims. Hence, there is a road to
travel to further develop and implement mature transparency institutions that
can live up to the promises of powerful, transformative, and democratic trans-
parency. The contributions to this issue provide quite a number of suggestions
for improving the design and implementation of transparency institutions and
practices.
In this section, however, I want to focus on transparency drawbacks that
are not so much related to imperfect design and implementation of transpar-
ency provisions, but rather address the fundamental idea of emancipatory trans-
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parency. I want to mention six potential pitfalls of stringent transparency provi-
sions and requirements, drawing on and taking the contributions to this issue
one step further. The six transparency drawbacks I discuss below are not all
widely apparent at present and do not yet massively endanger transparency
practices and institutional arrangements. But ongoing calls in environmental
politics for furthering transparency should make us attentive to the emergence
of such fundamental drawbacks.
First, although meant to empower the powerless, transparency can also
empower the powerful and thus become an instrument in furthering inequality.
This can work in various ways. The transparency provisions in various public
and private international agreements call for quite sophisticated procedures,
measurements, auditing and veriªcation arrangements, and reporting. Such
provisions are relatively easily fulªlled by richer and more developed states and
market parties, while poor nations and companies have considerable difªculties
in fulªlling transparency requirements.14 Such difªculties are exacerbated if im-
plementation failures of transparency provisions are combined with sanctions
or restrictions in market access, as is the case with labeling and certiªcation
schemes.15 Hence, under such conditions transparency can empower and ad-
vantage powerful international actors, and strengthen their position in interna-
tional environmental politics. In this way transparency can work against its
emancipatory promise. Fulªlling transparency requirements in such cases works
together with articulating and enhancing existing inequality, or creating a new
dimension in existing power differences.
Second and related, putting transparency at the center of new forms of en-
vironmental politics does not have equal beneªt in all circumstances. Transpar-
ency will only execute its powers under speciªc conditions: when those meant
to use the disclosed information have access to and literacy regarding this infor-
mation; and when those whose information is disclosed are vulnerable to accu-
sations of poor environmental performance. Both are not always the case. Mi-
norities in developing countries that are faced with environmental pollution or
resource destruction have to rely on support from Western NGOs in order to un-
derstand, access and use disclosed information in any claims against multina-
tional companies operating in their territory. Not all polluting companies are
receptive to the risk of reputational damage, for instance when they are poorly
connected to the global economy.16 And in international environmental poli-
tics, countries are not always very concerned or responsive when their poor en-
vironmental performance is disclosed. In such circumstances, transparency is of
little help both in improving the environment and in empowering the
powerless.
Third, rather than a means of empowerment, transparency can also be-
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come implicated in further surveillance and control. This is very much related to
the question asked by, among others, Gupta: transparency for whom?17
Normally (and all contributions to this issue provide evidence of this) we inter-
pret transparency as disclosure of environmental information from polluting
producers and failing states for civil society actors. But this is, of course, a lim-
ited reading of possible architects and recipients of transparency. Now that we
are witnessing a consumerist turn in environmental politics,18 and now that
producers are also identiªed as change agents for environmental reform,19
transparency may also turn into the disclosure of environmental information of
citizen-consumers for producers. And if that is the case, should we not interpret
such transparency in terms of surveillance rather than empowerment? The
smart utility meters in the Netherlands that can identify detailed personal water
and energy use patterns and that can communicate this information back to
utility companies for monitoring and billing purposes are a form of transpar-
ency. Citizen-consumers are increasingly concerned about the surveillance con-
sequences of such developments.20 Similar concerns can be raised about moni-
toring car mobility via national or European road pricing systems or use of price
reduction card systems by large retailers for monitoring green shopping behav-
ior. And more institutionally, environmental NGOs can be required to disclose
information sources or ªnancial donations and spending. A whole new set of
questions relate to these forms of transparency in environmental politics, which
cast transparency in a different light.
Fourth, mature transparency comes together with growing ºows of infor-
mation and claims. Scott Lash has been rather critical about the increasing
informationalization, mediatization and digitalization of every aspect of hu-
man life, resulting in what we could call a disinformation age.21 In a disinforma-
tion age information is out of control through overloads, misinformation and
disinformation. With the advance of transparency, global environmental poli-
tics can also fall victim to a tsunami of environmental information, to “drown-
ing in disclosure” as Gupta calls it.22 If we fail to have powerful, legitimate and
widely accepted institutions available that can be trusted to distinguish true
from false information,23 transparency can become the victim of its own success
and disempower itself. It goes without saying that there are major interests that
will not be too unhappy with such outcomes and actively support disinforma-
tion, information controversies and information overloads. Right-wing coali-
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memetersniet.nl, accessed 2 April 2010.
21. Lash 2002.
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See Mol 2008.
tions of climate skeptics have been rather successful in developing such an in-
formational strategy, where transparency and disclosure is no longer associated
with transformative powers, but rather with “stuck in the mud” attitudes.24 Only
in situations of information scarcity and secrecy and with “certiªed” informa-
tion, does transparency seem to work well as a powerful transformative mecha-
nism. If not, disclosure of information can as much disempower civil society
and paralyze environmental reforms.
Fifth, and directly connected to the former point, transparency will only
work when the quality and reliability of information is guarded and guaranteed.
Disclosure of unreliable and poor quality information does not bring us further
and does not empower the powerless.25 At the same time, calls for quality and
reliability of environmental information can turn against stringent environ-
mental protection politics. The US Data Quality Act (DQA)26 is a clear case. The
Act requires state agencies to establish procedures to ensure and maximize the
quality, objectivity, utility and integrity of the information they disseminate. Via
this Act the growing regulation by information of environmental agencies is
counteracted by business and industry via the regulation of environmental in-
formation. Information transparency and dissemination is chilled, as agencies
ªnd it too troublesome to fulªll the DQA guidelines (for the US Environmental
Protection Agency alone, the guidelines run to 55 pages) and risk petitions of
industry based on the DQA.27 Hence, the Bush Administration (2000–2008)
used information quality and reliability arguments to limit transparency and in-
formation disclosure, and thus set back informational governance.
Finally, the question emerges—also in various contributions to this is-
sue—whether transparency actually improves environmental performance. Can
we indeed relate the often normative and procedural transparency provisions
with substantive improvements in environmental performance or environmen-
tal justice? Mason, Auld and Gulbrandsen, Mol, Fung and colleagues, and oth-
ers have argued for the at best poor—and often difªcult to prove—relations be-
tween procedural provisions of information disclosure on the one hand and
substantive environmental improvements on the other.28 The question is to
what extent this conclusion (i) reºects the current state of the art in transpar-
ency implementation (hence, implying that we have to advance transparency
further in order to see environmental improvements); (ii) relates to problems of
establishing causal relations between transparency and environment quality
improvement (hence, our methodologies fall short); and/or (iii) whether some-
thing more fundamental is at stake regarding the hypothetical relation between
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transparency and environmental quality (hence, implying that this assumed
link is incorrect)? Transparency debates will no doubt focus on these issues in
the future, and I elaborate on them further in the concluding section.
Future Promises of Transparency Politics
Given its relation to wider developments of the Information Age, we expect
transparency to be here to stay, and to become ever more important—rather
than marginalized—in global environmental politics. Hence, we anticipate
more calls for, practices of, infrastructures for, and legal provisions on environ-
mental transparency. These future disclosure-related developments will most
likely reºect at least four speciªc characteristics.
First, future environmental controversies will contain major information
controversies. Information is likely to become a major environmental bat-
tleªeld, and transparency is fully placed in the center of it. With information
and transparency moving to the center of environmental politics, we will see
that issues of accountability, auditing and veriªcation, the codiªcations of trans-
parency requirements, and scandals around mis-and disinformation become
more central. This will mean that transparency will become multi-layered. Pri-
mary transparency is related to disclosure and openness of environmental infor-
mation and remains important. But in addition, transparency will also focus on
the disclosing agency, the media “owners” that facilitate or hinder transparency,
and the actors verifying, certifying and auditing environmental information
(the new transparency powerbrokers); this we might label secondary transpar-
ency. Hence, transparency will develop from “simple” transparency to “reºex-
ive” transparency.29 In the future, transparency will no longer be simply the dis-
closing of information and the access to this information, but will also involve a
complex of reºexive questions surrounding the interests, the legitimacy and the
secondary effects of disclosure and disclosing agencies.
Second, and related to the former point, the growing centrality of environ-
mental controversies around information will mean new balances of power and
new resource allocation strategies of actors, compared to the conventional ones.
Positions of actors, power balances, coalitions, resource dependencies, the rules
of the “environmental game,” and effective strategies—to name but a few—
change rapidly around environmental controversies. It is not easy to predict or
conclude who wins and who loses in these new constellations, also because ac-
tors and interest groups constantly react to changing conditions, and adapt their
strategies and coalitions accordingly. Environmental NGOs, with their advan-
tage of legitimacy capital, seem well placed vis-à-vis vulnerable multinational
companies that have a reputation to protect private interests. But the develop-
ments around the plan to sink the Shell oil platform Brent Spar in 1995 in the
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among others, Beck, Giddens, and Lash 1994. It partly parallels the idea of layers of transpar-
ency put forward by Klintman and Boström 2008, 180.
Atlantic has shown us that legitimacy capital of environmental NGOs (in this
case Greenpeace) is vulnerable and easily “melts into thin air.” So, future trans-
parency developments have no easy winners or deªnite losers; but do involve
major changes in the rules and resources of global environmental politics.
Third, transparency is at the moment predominantly related to, fuelled by
and based within civil society. Hence, it has strong normative undertones of de-
mocracy and participation. With the growing importance of transparency in en-
vironmental politics we can expect it to also become part of—and stronger ruled
and fuelled by—markets and monetization. Environmental information has
never been isolated from economics and markets, for instance where it relates to
the funding of environmental monitoring programs; where it involves markets
for certiªed green/organic products, processes and services; or with respect to
GIS, remote sensing and other satellite-based information systems. But with the
growing importance of and calls for transparency, the economic value and im-
portance of transparency and disclosed information will be further enhanced
for states and market actors. We already see an exponential growth of ªrms and
systems that not only sell and market environmental information and certiªca-
tion services, but also try to market transparency and trust. We also see environ-
mental NGOs monetizing their reputation, trust and legitimacy, via ªnancial
compensation for their logos and endorsements. This opens up a whole new set
of questions on the relation between markets and transparency, which will
become pressing in the near future. How much of the normative undertones
will be, can be, and have to be realized in such market-based transparency
arrangements?
Finally, and following the former point, whereas initially environmental
transparency and information disclosure in OECD countries entailed place-
based and state-organized systems facilitating the right-to-know about environ-
mental pollution, more recent systems are placeless—attached to transnational
ºows—organized by non-state actors (although more than incidentally backed
by states) and focused on environmental improvements.30 Gupta’s conclusion
on the market driven disclosures in transnational GM food trade—rather than
the transparency provisions in international treaties—provides a clear example
of this.31 These tendencies in transparency systems of course very much reºect
current conditions of globalization and diversity in modes of governance. And
they ªt very well into the rapid developments in transnational environmental
politics since the 1990s. At the same time quite a few developing and transi-
tional states have never experienced the ªrst generation of transparency, and are
directly confronted with new transparency systems through their inclusion in
global environmental interactions in politics, the economy and civil society.
This global transparency divide—and the closing of the global “disclosure
gap”—will become one of the challenges for future transparency politics. If we
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do not succeed in closing the gap, the future of transparency in global environ-
mental politics will deªnitely look less bright.
Epilogue
Returning to the transparency promises set out in the introduction, a balanced
answer follows on the two main transparency challenges in global environmen-
tal politics.
First, do transparency politics live up to their normative and democratic
promises? We seem to have reached a crucial point in time. Looking backwards,
the conclusion should be that transparency and disclosure have done more
good than harm in terms of democracy, setting favorable conditions for partici-
pation, and making access to information more equally distributed across dif-
ferent interest groups in society. The past of transparency is far from ideal, but
on balance positive for democracy. Assessing current transparency tendencies
and looking into the future, this overall positive past assessment does not auto-
matically extend into the future. The growing importance attached to transpar-
ency in environmental politics ensures that it becomes a central object of power
struggles, with uncertain outcomes in terms of democracy. Markets and states
will aim to capture transparency arrangements for their own goals, which will
not necessarily be in line with the original normative ideas of democracy and
participation.32
The second challenge asks whether disclosure of environmental informa-
tion leads to a better environment. In assessing new modes of environmental
governance a key concern will indeed be related to what might instrumentally
be labeled “environmental effectiveness.” Various studies have tried to assess the
effectiveness of new governance approaches and modes that are squarely based
on information and the disclosure of information.33 To be sure and short, it is
not possible to arrive at a general and overall conclusion about whether, how
and to what extent effective transparency and disclosure systems protect envi-
ronmental quality or reduce environmental burdens. The environmental suc-
cess of informational governance can at best be assessed in concrete time-space
contexts, where speciªc arrangements operate in managing speciªc environ-
mental ºows and practices. Although even then results and assessments are
difªcult to interpret and to generalize for various reasons, we should at least be
able to formulate conclusions and recommendations on speciªc improvements
in such schemes, as we saw in the various contributions to this issue. Assessing
environmental successes of concrete—that is, time-space speciªc—eco-labeling
schemes, monitoring and disclosure practices, auditing and veriªcation institu-
tions, and company reporting systems can provide insight on how to improve
such schemes and arrangements, whether and how they should be connected
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with conventional regulatory regimes, and where the sites of power are located
to make a difference.
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